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1. Introduction 
 
Within the enlarged European Union (EU) the fear of fiscal dumping has increased 
considerably. Fiscal dumping refers to the practice of setting low (effective) tax rates in 
order to attract foreign (direct) investment. Within the EU-15, fiscal dumping was 
practiced in the field of corporate taxation by Ireland only. As such it was a minor 
inconvenience. However, within the EU-25, most new member states have very low 
effective corporate income tax rates. In 2004 France and Germany proposed the use of 
enhanced cooperation to fight (excessive) corporate tax competition, by establishing a 
single corporate tax zone, initially in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain only.2 Within 
this zone there would be a single corporate tax, with a single base and rate. In this way the 
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member states for EU structural funds support was linked to membership of the corporate tax zone. 
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countries within the zone would be able to compete with countries outside the zone (by 
reducing transaction costs for companies operating within the zone), and competition 
within the zone would be minimized. 
This plea for enhanced cooperation in the field of corporate income taxation follows from 
the fact not much progress has been made in terms of harmonisation of direct taxes in the 
EU, as direct taxation is still subject to unanimity voting in the Council. With EU wide 
direct tax harmonisation having been put on the back burner (a line taken by former 
Commissioner Bolkestein and endorsed fully by current Internal Market Commissioner 
McCreevy, but less so by Taxation Commissioner Kovács) enhanced cooperation may 
well be the only way left to deal with issues of direct tax coordination in the EU.3 
 
Just as the reasons for getting engaged in enhanced cooperation in taxation may be diverse 
(dealing with unanimity deadlock, tackling excessive tax competition, decreasing 
transaction costs and thus removing barriers to trade, allowing for intra-EU differences in 
policy preferences, et cetera), so are the forms such cooperation can take. “Enhanced 
cooperation” generally refers to the mechanism of Articles 43-45 of the EU Treaty.4 
Cooperation between a subset of EU member states does not, however, have to follow the 
road laid out in the Treaty. Sub-integration can also take place outside the enhanced-
cooperation-framework and even outside the EU framework as such. 
 
This paper deals with the possibilities for and possible effects of sub-integration in the 
field of (corporate) taxation. It is structured as follows. First, in section 2, we briefly 
discuss the state-of-affairs as far as corporate tax coordination in the EU is concerned. 
Next, in section 3, different forms of sub-integration in general will be discussed, and a 
taxonomy of sub-integration will be put forward. Section 4 deals with possibilities for sub-
integration with regard to corporate taxation. Section 5 focuses on current (and future) 
formal regulations regarding enhanced cooperation within the EU. Section 6 deals with the 
                                                          
3 Earlier pleas for the use of enhanced cooperation in taxation were made regarding environmental taxation, 
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excise differentials between Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Germany, and Poland 
(EUObserver.com, 20-10-2004). 
4 Title VII – Provisions on enhanced cooperation, was incorporated into the EU Treaty by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, and became operational in May 1999. The provisions were later amended by means of the 
Treaty of Nice. 
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possible effects of enhanced cooperation in the field of corporate taxation. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Corporate tax coordination in the EU 
 
The harmonisation efforts of the EU have only been successful in the field of taxes on 
consumption (value added tax, excises), as a prerequisite of the completion of the Single 
European Market (SEM). Tax harmonisation efforts in the field of direct taxation display a 
multitude of reports, initiatives, Commission proposals, proposed Directives, draft 
Directives, preliminary draft Directives and such, the bulk of which were withdrawn later 
on. Apart from a Council Regulation on the application of social security schemes to 
individuals who choose to work in another member state, the harmonisation of direct taxes 
in the EU has been confined to certain aspects of corporate taxation, more precisely to: 
a.  the corporate income tax, and the withholding tax on dividends; 
b.  the withholding tax on interest; 
c.  the taxation of groups of companies (including taxation of parent-subsidiary dividends). 
With company taxation a twofold problem of double taxation arises. First, corporate 
profits are taxed as company profits (corporate income tax) as well as shareholders 
dividends (personal income tax). Each member state in the EU has dealt with this problem 
of double taxation differently. Most countries have some kind of dividend relief system, at 
the shareholder level (imputation system, tax credit system, or special personal income tax 
rate). Secondly, profits that are distributed to foreign investors (private investors, or 
foreign companies) may be taxed in the country where these profits arise, as well as in the 
country the investor resides. Basically, company profits in the EU are taxed according to 
the origin or source principle. What happens to repatriated profits, is outside the field of 
vision of the source state. Even if the source state provides for an identical treatment of 
domestic and foreign investors, it has no say over the tax treatment of ‘exported profits’. 
Figure 1 shows the different systems used by different EU member states. 
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Figure 1: Different corporate income tax systems in the EU 
 
Taken from Finkenzeller & Spengel, 2004:14. 
 
Combined, these two double-taxation problems have proved to be insurmountable for the 
EU. Initially (in 1975) the European Commission aimed at eliminating double taxation on 
dividends through a full (i.e. base and rate) harmonisation of company tax systems. In 
1990 these proposals were withdrawn, for lack of support from member states. The 
underlying problem is that imputation is more often than not offered to domestic 
shareholders only, which, of course, is discriminatory against foreign shareholders. 
Company taxes in the EU discriminate between (various kinds of) in-state and out-of-state 
investors and result in an arbitrary division of the company income tax base between the 
state of investment and the state of the investor. A shift to the residence principle would 
solve this problem, but would mean that countries forgo the right to tax income arising 
within their own territory, i.e. forgo on a considerable part of their “power to tax”. 
Therefore, the problem was approached by the Commission along the lines set out in the 
1992 report of the Ruding Committee: aligning company tax systems, and restricting 
company tax rates (by setting a minimum and a maximum rate). But even that proved to 
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be a bridge too far for most member states, which is why in 2001 the Commission came 
up with the idea of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). This CCCTB 
can be used by companies that are involved in cross-border activities within the EU to 
calculate their taxable profits, and the apportionment of these profits over the member 
states involved. Within this system member states are free to apply their own corporate tax 
rate to their portion of company profits. Although often presented as a harmonisation 
scheme, the CCCTB actually is an optional 26th system next to 25 systems already in 
place. It is up to companies to decide whether they want to use the CCCTB or not (in the 
latter case they can still use the national systems). 
The Commission is currently aiming to get the CCCTB introduced by the end of 2008.5 
Initially, the Commission expected the idea of a CCCTB to be supported by around 20 
member states6, but apparently the idea is currently supported only by Austria, France, 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, and Hungary. Most member states are hesitant, 
and some are outright opponents of the idea: United Kingdom, Ireland, Baltic States, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.7 Commissioner Kovács has argued that if necessary the idea will 
be endorsed using the enhanced cooperation mechanism. 
That brings us to the question whether enhanced cooperation is the only mechanism for 
sub-integration in the field of (corporate) taxation. Before returning to that question in 
section 4, we will first discuss sub-integration in more general terms. 
 
 
3. Sub-integration 
 
Sub-integration refers to an integration that takes place among some but not all members 
of an already existing (larger) integration, and can take different shapes. The first 
distinctive feature is whether sub-integration takes place within the EU institutional 
framework or not. If sub-integration uses another institutional framework it can either be 
labeled new integration or alternative integration.8 New integration refers to sub-
integration outside the EU institutional framework dealing with policy areas that are not 
part of the EU policy domain. Sub-integration outside the EU institutional framework, 
                                                          
5 European Commission, 2006:8. 
6 EurActiv, Wednesday 26 October 2005. 
7 European Voice, 13-19 April 2006, p. 7. 
8 The distinction between the four types of (sub-)integration is based on but different from Su (2005a), who 
uses the terms opt-out integration (rather than alternative integration) and alienated integration (rather than 
odd integration). 
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concerned with policy areas that are within the EU domain, is called alternative 
integration. In both cases it is possible to cooperate with either EU member states only or 
with outsiders as well (third countries). 
If sub-integration occurs within the EU institutional framework, there are again two 
possibilities. Odd integration is sub-integration that employs EU institutions but deals 
with policies outside the EU domain. Differentiated integration is sub-integration within 
the institutional framework as well within as the policy domain of the EU. 
 
In the literature a large variety of concepts and terms has been put forward to denote 
certain types of sub-integration or “flexibility”: inter se agreements, partial agreements, 
parallel procedures, two-speed Europe, multi-speed Europe, multi-speed integration, 
European vanguard, avant-garde group, directoire, pioneers’ clubs, pioneers and 
followers, core Europe, Kern Europas, Harter Kern, noyau dûr, centre de gravité, centre 
of gravitation, variable geometry, géometrie variable, Europe à la carte, pick-and-choose, 
differentiated Europe, Abgestüfte Integration, two-tier Europe, multi-tier Europe, plusiers 
niveaux, concentric circles, cercles excentriques, magnetic fields, hub-and-spoke-Europe, 
eccentric ellipses, opt-in arrangements, opt-out arrangements, constructive abstention, 
declaratory abstention, positive abstention, active abstention, transition periods, special 
treatments, derogations, exemptions, flying geese, breakaway riders and pelotons.9 
All of these concepts deal with two forms of sub-integration only: either with alternative 
integration or with differentiated integration. 
 
3.1 Alternative integration 
 
Europe is abound with integration outside the EU framework. Being EU member does not 
mean countries have given up all other treaty-making authority, which is exercised in 
relation with third countries as well as co-EU-members. Such agreements are called inter 
se agreements, partial agreements, or parallel procedures. Some examples of 
alternative integration are: 
- the Benelux cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; 
- the monetary union between Belgium and Luxembourg (which was later incorporated 
into the EMU); 
                                                          
9 See inter alia Wallace and Wallace (1995), Lansdaal (2002) and Federal Trust (2005) for overviews of 
concepts of “flexibility”, on which the description offered here of different concepts is largely based. 
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- the Nordic cooperation between Finland and Sweden; 
- the Schengen cooperation based on an Agreement signed in 1985 (and which later did 
became part of the EU framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam); 
- Common Travel Area between the UK and Ireland; 
- the Bologna Process dealing higher education, which now involves 40 European 
countries; 
- the European Patent Organisation, which is made up of 31 European states, including 
all EU member states (except for Malta); 
- cooperation within the framework of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); 
- cooperation within the OECD; 
- various other bilateral or multilateral treaties on tax issues, environmental issues, 
culture and education.  
In some of these cases (for instance the Benelux) the term alternative integration as a form 
of sub-integration may be misleading, because the “alternative” cooperation was already 
there before the larger integration within the EU framework. The EEC Treaty did not 
make an end to existing bilateral or multilateral treaties, a line which has been held on to 
with the various accession treaties. 
Also, some of these forms of cooperation do not so much deal with functional cooperation 
(i.e. cooperation in a specific policy area) but have developed into forms of structured 
coordination of views in order to maximize influence on decision-making. Again, the 
Benelux is an example of such a structured coordination. 
Interestingly, we can see that alternative integration has more than one potential 
advantage. First, with parallel agreements it is possible to cover a larger part of Europe 
than just the EU-25 (or before 2004: the EU-15). Secondly, alternative integration may be 
beneficial because the EU framework imposes all kinds of constraints (in terms of 
decision-making, legislation, democratic accountability et cetera). This clearly must be the 
case in those examples of alternative integration where the entire EU is involved. Thirdly, 
and contrarily, inter se agreements may be seen as a form of enhanced cooperation 
between a relatively small sub-set of member states, but without using the EU enhanced 
cooperation mechanism. 
The success of alternative integration can be seen in two different lights. On the one hand, 
manifold alternative integration to a certain extent is the result of failure of integration 
within the EU framework. If member states cannot satisfactorily deal with policy 
problems inside the EU, they will start looking for alternative arrangements. On the other 
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hand, alternative integration is sometimes perceived as a threat to the larger EU 
integration, and all kinds of possibilities for differentiated integration (within the EU 
institutional framework), to which we now turn, have developed - especially since the 
Treaty of Maastricht- as an alternative to “alternative” integration. 
 
3.2 Differentiated integration 
 
The starting point to discuss differentiated integration (i.e. sub-integration within the EU 
institutional framework and policy domain) is the EU default mode of integration, which 
involves uniformity in time and matter (monolithic integration or unitary integration). 
Common goals are set, EU wide, and are to be reached at a certain uniform point of time 
by all member states. 
Departure from this default mode is possible along a number of dimensions: 
1. Differentiation can refer to time only as opposed to differentiation in time and matter. 
Put differently: to what extent should sub-integration eventually be an exclusive thing? 
If there is differentiation in time only, common -EU wide- goals are retained but may 
be reached at different points of time by different member states. Sub-integration in 
this sense is open to all, and indeed is successful only if eventually all members of the 
larger integration participate (after which the sub-integration is simply absorbed into 
that larger integration). If there is differentiation in time and matter, aiming at and 
attaining certain policy goals will be exclusive to the ‘insiders’; 
2. Sub-integration may deal either with a single issue (or a few single, non-related issues) 
or with a multitude of (potentially interrelated) policy issues; 
3. Sub-integration can differ as far as the size of the group of insiders is concerned 
(relative to the size of the group of outsiders); 
4. The composition of the group of insiders can be steady across the range of policy areas 
in which sub-integration occurs, but which can also vary (mixed coalitions); 
5. Moreover, such coalitions can be more or less stable over time; 
6. There can be a difference in influence in issues of the larger integration between those 
member states inside and those member states outside the sub-integration. 
 
The closest thing to the default mode of unitary integration is differentiation in time only, 
on a limited number of issues, and involving a limited number of outsiders. Transitional 
arrangements, temporary derogations and/or exemptions (to the acquis 
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communautaire) are a clear example of this kind of sub-integration. Such differentiation 
has always been part of the Treaties (and of numerous Protocols) and of specific 
Community Directives. Constructive abstention (declaratory abstention, positive 
abstention, active abstention) is yet another possibility, restricted by the Treaty (Art. 23 
TEU, see also Art. III-201 of the draft Constitutional Treaty) to specific measures taken as 
part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With constructive abstention a 
member state can simply declare that it does not support the decision taken and will not 
apply it itself, but accepts that the decision commits the Union.10 Constructive abstention 
to a large extent resembles the more general idea of a (temporary and single-issue) opt-
out clause, as for instance used by the United Kingdom and Denmark to be left out of the 
third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
If a larger number of member states opt-out, but these outsiders are still expected to catch-
up with the others at a later stage, such sub-integration can be labeled multi-speed 
Europe (two-speed Europe, multi-speed integration). The idea here is that European 
integration is driven forward by a sub-group of member states, but no member state is 
excluded in the long run nor can member states exclude themselves everlastingly. 
Differentiation is allowed to exist temporarily only. A special case of multi-speed is 
Abgestüfte Integration. Member states agree on particular policy objectives, but specific 
timetables or stages of adoption by individual member states are set. Differentiation here 
is a matter of (timing of) policy implementation rather than policy goals. 
The multi-speed concept is rather similar to the idea of a European vanguard group 
(avant-garde group, directoire, pioneers’ clubs, pioneers and followers, pathfinders, 
breakaway riders). Again, the final goal is to reach shared objectives, with the vanguard 
group braking ground and shaping these objectives along the way. 
 
Other forms of differentiated integration assume that differentiation is not necessarily 
temporary. The idea of a core Europe (Kern Europas, Harter Kern, noyau dûr) assumes 
a highly restricted membership of that core which is (potentially) permanently limited. 
The core countries get engaged in far deeper integration than member states outside the 
core. The latter do not longer constrain the former. The deeper integration does involve 
multiple related issues, and core countries do have a considerably larger overall influence 
                                                          
10 If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the 
Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be 
adopted. 
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than countries outside the core. The idea of a two-tier Europe is essentially the same, but 
uses another kind of visualization.11 The related ideas of concentric circles (cercles 
excentriques) and of multi-tier Europe (Europe de plusiers niveaux) differ in that they 
assume the existence of more than just two groups (insiders <> outsiders). 
Variable geometry (géometrie variable) is yet another concept of sub-integration. It also 
assumes a permanent state of sub-integration to be established, due to the fact that 
integrative capacities and desires will vary across the Union. Variable geometry envisages 
a series of different policy areas (on top of the internal market), all of which would have 
varying membership (or: policy consortia).12 Contrary to the idea of a hard core, which 
puts a permanent set of member states in the middle of integration, variable geometry 
starts from the internal market as core policy, around which various other policies have 
developed and will develop. This policy area configuration as well the membership of the 
different policy consortia is however rather stable. The latter is not necessarily the case 
with Europe à la carte (or: pick-and-choose, or: opt-in-opt-out). Moreover, the policy 
core here is not a full-fledged internal market but a common trading zone. 
 
Table 1 summarizes (and complements) the above. 
 
                                                          
11 The same goes for concepts like magnetic fields, centre of gravitation, and hub-and-spoke Europe. 
12 The concept of eccentric ellipses (Gomes de Andrade, 2005) is one way of visualizing this variable 
geometry. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of different types of differentiated integration 
 
 Differentiation in 
time only or in time 
and matter? 
Single or 
multiple 
issues 
Nummer and size of 
insider/outsider 
groups 
Single <> 
mixed coalitions 
across policy 
areas 
Stability of 
coalition(s) 
over time 
Concentration of 
overall 
influence/power 
Transition periods, special treatments, 
derogations, exemptions, « differentiated 
Europe » 
Time only Single 
issue 
Outsider group: small - - - 
Constructive abstention, 
declaratory/positive/active abstention 
Time only Single 
issue 
Outsider group: small - - - 
Opt-out arrangements (In principle) time 
only 
Single 
issue 
Outsider group: small - - - 
Multi-speed Europe, multi-speed 
integration, two-speed Europe 
(In principle) time 
only 
Single or 
multiple 
issues 
Insider and outsider 
groups: medium size 
Single coalition Stable Powerful insiders 
Abgestüfte Integration Time only Single 
issue 
Multiple groups, or 
individual 
implementation 
- - - 
European vanguard, avant-garde group, 
directoire, pioneers’s clubs, pioneers and 
followers, breakaway riders and pelotons 
(In principle) time 
only 
Single or 
multiple 
issues 
Insider group: small Mixed 
coalitions 
Changing No concentration of 
power 
Core Europe, Kern Europas, Harter Kern, 
noyau dûr 
In time and matter Multiple 
issues 
Insider group: small Single coalition Stable Powerful insiders 
Two-tier Europe, multi-tier Europe, plusiers 
niveaux 
In time and matter Multiple 
issues 
Insider and outsider 
group: medium size 
Single coalition Stable Powerful insiders 
Concentric circles, cercles excentriques, 
magnetic fields, centre de gravité, centre of 
gravitation, hub-and- spoke Europe 
In time and matter Multiple 
issues 
Multiple relatively 
small groups 
Single 
coalitions 
Changing Powerful insiders 
Variable geometry, géometrie variable, 
eccentric ellipses 
In time and matter Multiple 
issues 
Multiple relatively 
small groups (policy 
consortia) 
Mixed 
coalitions 
Changing No concentration of 
power 
Europe à la carte, pick-and-choose, opt-in-
opt-out 
In time and matter Multiple 
issues 
Multiple relatively 
small groups 
Mixed 
coalitions 
Changing No concentration of 
power 
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The table clearly shows that the differences between the various forms of differentiated 
integration are gradual only, and it is hard to label actual examples of differentiated 
integration. The EMU, for instance, can be considered as an example of two-speed 
Europe, resembles a vanguard group, involves opt-outs, but can also be regarded as the 
current and future EU core. 
Moreover, the difference between odd integration (defined in the previous section as 
integration within the EU framework but dealing with policies outside the EU 
competencies) and differentiated integration, rests on the assumption that there is a stable 
EU policy domain. But what may be odd integration at first, can easily become 
differentiated integration as views on what policy areas the EU should deal with evolve 
over time, possibly as a result of vanguard group activity. 
Finally, not included in our discussion is the possibility of partial EU membership and 
extended associations, which of course is close to the European core idea, or the idea of 
concentric circles.13 
 
The different types of flexibility are of course linked to certain views on how European 
integration should proceed, and in some cases can be linked to specific member states. 
The idea of a Europe à la carte can be regarded as a mechanism to break federalist 
dynamism (Philippart and Sie Dhian Ho, 2003:110) and has been put forward in 1994 by 
then Prime Minister John Mayor.14 Ideas like the noyeau dûr, géometrie variable, and 
cercles excentriques have been advocated by French politicians (Delors, Mitterand, 
Balladur), assuming a Franco-German coalition at the heart and at the helm of Europe.15 
 
 
As Su (2005b) argues, the necessity to start thinking and talking about differentiated 
integration was raised due the upcoming enlargement of the EU. In his analysis (partly 
building on Philippart and Sie Dhian Ho) enlargement has been postponed time and time 
again, in order for the EU to reach consensus on mechanisms it could use to deal with 
diversity, which explains the emergence of opt-outs, the increased importance of 
subsidiarity, the embracement in 2000 of the open method of policy coordination, and –
last but not least- of enhanced cooperation. When it became clear quite early in the process 
                                                          
13 See Su (2005b:524) for a more detailed description of this –French- idea of different circles, with the outer 
circle consisting of EU partners rather than EU members. 
14 In his William and Mary Lecture given in Leiden in June 1994. 
15 See Lansdaal (2002) for a more detailed discussion of joint Franco-German ideas in this field. 
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that the CEE countries would not content themselves with association agreements but 
wanted “full” EU membership, and EU leaders –pressured by Germany- had to give 
enlargement the green light (in Copenhagen, June 1993), a new mechanism had to be 
found to make differentiation between EU members possible. 
 
 
4. Sub-integration and corporate taxation 
 
A complex and diverse pattern of tax co-ordination has developed in the EU, in which 
four major co-ordinating instruments can be made out (Groenendijk, 1999): 
• the use of directives and resolutions for harmonisation of taxes, and based on that the 
‘use’ (especially by the Commission) of the Court of Justice to fight discriminatory 
taxation; 
• the use of multi-lateral agreements within the EU framework, but without use of the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism. Obviously, we are referring here to the use of the 
Code of Conduct for business taxation, on which the Ecofin Council agreed on 1 
December 1997. This Code prevents the introduction of new fiscal measures that could 
influence the place of investment, like tax measures which provide for a significantly 
lower effective level of taxation (including zero taxation) than those which generally 
apply in the member states in question, like granting special advantages only to non-
residents, like providing rules for calculating the profits of multinationals which deviate 
from OECD-rules, and like the less strict application of tax regulations by the tax 
authorities. The Code of Conduct provides for a review process to determine which 
potentially harmful measures are actually harmful and which have to be rolled back. 
For new measures there is a standstill clause: member states will refrain from 
introducing new harmful measures. Although the Code was conducted by the EU-15, 
and is formally not part of the acquis communautaire, in the accession treaties all new 
EU members states have declared to live up to the Code16;  
• the use of numerous bilateral agreements, outside the EU framework, like tax treaties17; 
• the use of multi-lateral agreements outside the EU framework, particularly within the 
OECD (and using OECD model tax treaties). 
                                                          
16 Strictly speaking, because the Code is upheld EU wide, there is no sub-integration involved here. 
17 See for instance the IBFD European Tax Handbook 2005 for an overview. 
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The former two instruments are used especially in indirect taxation; the latter two are 
dominant in direct taxation. In other words: alternative integration is very common when 
it comes to corporate taxation. Such integration does not fundamentally deal with the basic 
problem of having 25 different corporate tax systems, but it does take the edge off the 
main negative effects of having all these different systems. 
 
In corporate taxation, (sub-)integration has largely taken place outside the EU. As became 
clear in sections 1 and 2, there is a growing body of opinion that enhanced cooperation 
(i.e. sub-integration within the EU framework) is also feasible. We will now turn to the 
formal regulations (section 5) and possible effects (section 6) of enhanced cooperation in 
corporate taxation. 
 
 
5. Enhanced cooperation: formal regulations 
 
Provisions regarding “closer cooperation” appear for the first time in the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty, following the 1996 IGC. Three years later these provisions were augmented and 
restated (now using the term “enhanced cooperation”) by means of the Treaty of Nice, 
following the 2000 IGC. The Treaty of Nice became effective on February 1, 2003. In the 
draft Constitutional Treaty the Nice mechanism has been subjected to further changes.18 
 
The closer cooperation mechanism of the Treaty of Amsterdam was a very cautious and 
rather general mechanism allowing a group of willing states to undertake closer 
cooperation among themselves while using the institutional mechanisms of the EU, but 
only if others would allow them to do so (De Witte, 2004: 145). This mechanism was 
established in the first and third pillars, and contained an emergency brake procedure: 
Council had to decide on closer cooperation by qualified majority but any member state, 
for important and stated reasons of national policy, could refer the proposal to the 
European Council for a unanimous decision (constituting a de facto veto right). 
                                                          
18 Articles 43-45 Treaty on European Union (substantive and procedural conditions in general), Articles 11 
and 11a Treaty establishing the European Community (decisions on enhanced cooperation proposals in the 
first pillar), Article 40 Treaty on European Union (specific substantive conditions, second pillar), Articles 
40a and 40b Treaty on European Union (decisions on enhanced cooperation proposals in the second pillar), 
Articles 27a-27b Treaty on European Union (specific substantive conditions, second pillar ), Articles 27c-
27e Treaty on European Union (decisions on enhanced cooperation proposals in the third pillar). In the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty enhanced cooperation is dealt with in Articles I-43 and III-321-329. 
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Furthermore, closer cooperation had to be endorsed by a majority of member states 
(smaller groups were not allowed). The provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam have never 
been used. 
 
The Nice Treaty did away with the emergency brake procedure (in the first and third 
pillar) and extended enhanced cooperation to the second pillar (CFSP) but with an 
emergency brake (i.e. veto) procedure. In the first and second pillar proposals for 
enhanced cooperation (put to the Council by the Commission following a request from the 
member states involved) are subject to a qualified Council majority. The number of 
member states required for launching the procedure has changed from the majority to the 
fixed number of eight member states. 
Under the Nice Treaty enhanced cooperation is subject of a number of conditions, either 
substantive or procedural. 
The substantive conditions can be clustered as follows (following Philippart, 2003b). First, 
there are conditions specifying what enhanced cooperation should aim at. It should aim at 
furthering the objectives of the Union, at protecting and serving EU interests, and at 
reinforcing the process of European integration. Secondly, there is a list of what enhanced 
cooperation may not entail in light of the Union’s cohesion and internal coherence. 
Enhanced cooperation must respect the Treaties and the single institutional Union 
framework. It must not affect the acquis communautaire and must respect the whole of the 
Union’s policies. It must not undermine the internal market nor economic and social 
cohesion. Thirdly, several conditions deal with the protection of member states not 
participating in the enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation must respect the 
competences, rights, and obligations of the outsiders. It must not constitute a barrier to or 
discrimination in trade and must not distort competition. Fourthly, it is stated in which 
areas enhanced cooperation is simply forbidden. Enhanced cooperation is prohibited were 
the Union has no powers. It is prohibited in fields under the exclusive competence of the 
Union, and (within the second pillar) it must not have any military and defence 
implications. 
The procedural conditions are as follows. There is a participation threshold of eight 
member states. Enhanced cooperation is a last resort (i.e. when it has been established 
within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a 
reasonable period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties). And there is 
openness of enhanced cooperation to all EU member states, at all times, with participation 
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to be encouraged by the Commission and by the member states already engaged in 
enhanced cooperation. 
Decision-making within enhanced cooperation unions is envisaged as follows. All EU 
members are able to take part in deliberations, but only enhanced cooperation union 
members shall take part in adoption of decisions. The same decision rules (qualified 
majority rule, unanimity) and procedures (including Commission and EP involvement) 
apply as in the Union at large. Acts adopted and decisions taken within enhance 
cooperation unions shall not become part of the Union acquis (which new member states 
must adapt). They are not binding to the outsiders. Expenditure resulting from enhanced 
cooperation (other than administrative costs) will be borne by the insiders only. 
 
The Draft Constitution has stripped the enhanced cooperation mechanism of some of the 
conditions mentioned above (which by some were largely considered to be superfluous 
anyway; see Philippart 2003a, 2003b), but most provisions have been retained, albeit 
rephrased:19 
- enhanced cooperation should aim at furthering the objectives of the Union, protecting 
its interests, and at reinforcing the process of European integration; 
- it should be established within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive 
competences; 
- it may make use of the Union’s institutions; 
- it shall comply with the Union’s Constitution and law. It is however possible for the 
member states engaged in enhanced cooperation to decide (unanimously) to take 
decisions by qualified majority even if in the specific area unanimity is the rule; 
- it should be open at all times to all EU member states; 
- it is a last resort (i.e. it has to be established within the Council that the objectives of 
such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a 
whole); 
- a participation threshold of one third of all member states (rather than the fixed 
number of eight member states); 
- all EU members are able to take part in deliberations, only enhanced cooperation 
union members shall take part in the vote; 
                                                          
19 We refrain here from discussing the special provisions for enhanced cooperation in the area of CFSP as 
the focus in this paper is on tax matters. 
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- acts adopted and decisions taken within enhanced cooperation unions shall not become 
part of the Union acquis (which new EU member states must adapt upon accession). 
They are not binding to the outsiders, but EU members wishing to join the enhanced 
cooperation at a later stage have to adapt the enhanced cooperation acquis;  
- it must not undermine the internal market nor economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and it shall not distort competition; 
- enhanced cooperation must respect the competences, rights, and obligations of the 
outsiders; 
- expenditure resulting from enhanced cooperation (other than administrative costs) will 
be borne by the insiders only; 
- the Council grants authorization to proceed with enhanced cooperation by a European 
decision, upon a proposal from the Commission, and after obtaining consent of 
European Parliament. The Councils decides with qualified majority; 
- under the draft Treaty it is possible for states engaged in enhanced cooperation to put 
aside the unanimity rule as decision rule in areas such as direct taxation and social 
policy, and make decisions using a qualified majority rule. 
Both under the Nice Treaty and the draft Constitutional Treaty an important role is played 
by the European Commission.20 First, the Commission is to pass a request for enhanced 
cooperation to the Council by means of a Commission proposal. Secondly, the 
Commission vets any later applications of member states wanting to join the sub-group. 
 
 
6. Possible effects of enhanced cooperation in corporate taxation 
 
Suppose that a sub-set of EU countries would engage in further corporate tax 
coordination, within the enhanced cooperation framework (hereafter labelled: ECUCT, 
Enhanced Cooperation Union for Corporate Taxation). Such coordination could entail: 
- full base and rate harmonisation of their corporate tax systems (A); 
- base harmonisation only (B); 
- introduction of a CCCTB next to the corporate tax systems already in place (C).21 
What would the effects of such harmonisation be? 
                                                          
20 See Federal Trust (2005) for a discussion of the possible functioning of some other institutions under 
flexibility. 
21 A CCCTB would necessitate formula appointment of taxable profits. See Sørensen (2004) for an analysis 
of the specific economic effects of formula appointment. 
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1. Reduction of corporate tax compliance costs within the ECUCT 
Firstly, in all cases (A, B and C) we would expect a reduction of transaction costs for 
companies already operating across borders within the ECUCT. As such compliance costs 
are a deadweight loss to companies, such reduction represents a straightforward welfare 
gain for companies involved, which –in a competitive environment- should translate into 
lower prices and welfare gains for consumers. 
 
2. Increase in cross-border trade within the ECUCT 
High compliance costs do not only represent a deadweight loss, they also operate as a 
barrier to trade. Cross-border economic activities within the ECUCT are expected to 
increase with harmonisation. 
 
3. More efficient allocation of capital across the ECUCT 
If cross-country differences in effective tax rates would be reduced (which may happen to 
a certain extent in cases B and C, and fully in case A), this will lead to a more efficient 
allocation of capital across the ECUCT (Sørensen, 2004). Jensen & Svensson (2004) have 
shown that this effect is indeed larger with full harmonisation than with just tax base 
harmonisation. 
 
4. GDP changes coupled with tax revenue changes (due to changes in tax burden) 
Harmonisation of effective tax rates (due to base or base+rate harmonisation) will increase 
the tax burden in some ECUCT members and decrease the tax burden in other countries. 
A larger tax burden will result in higher tax revenues at a lower GDP; a lower tax burden 
will result in lower tax revenues at a higher GDP. 
Jensen & Svensson (2004) have made estimations of the effect of enhanced cooperation 
with full corporate tax harmonisation (our case A), between respectively the “old” EU-15, 
Eurozone and a EU-11-group.22 If these groups are expected to harmonize their tax rate on 
31%, 31.5% and 33% respectively (based on unweighted averages of current rates), this 
implies losses in GDP and gains in tax revenues. If harmonisation takes place using 
weighted averages of current rates there is an increase in GDP and a loss of tax revenues. 
                                                          
22 Consisting of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden. According to Jensen & Svensson, this grouping is based on common views on tax accounting 
issues. 
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The magnitude of these effects depends largely on the effect enhanced cooperation will 
have on Germany. Germany currently has a high corporate tax rate, as figure 2 shows. 
 
Figure 2: Effective top statutory tax rate on corporate income (in %, 2005) 
 
Taken from European Commission (2005:36) 
 
At the same time, Germany has a very low ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP, as table 
A1 shows (see Appendix). Any harmonisation of corporate tax bases will drastically 
increase the German base, and will lead to a sharp increase in the ECUCT tax burden, 
regardless of the composition (as long as Germany is in). To reach positive GDP effects 
harmonisation should take place in such a way that the full magnitude of the largest 
economy in Europe is taken into account. 
Table 2 shows the overall outcomes of the simulations done by Jensen & Svensson. 
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Table 2: Comparison of enhanced cooperation scenarios 
 
Taken from Jensen & Svensson (2004:35) 
“Welfare” refers to the efficiency gain due to decreased tax rate differentials. 
 
5. Distortion of preferences 
ECUCT members will suffer welfare losses due to distortion of their individual taxation 
preferences, which have to make way for collective ECUCT preferences. These 
preferences concern the overall importance of the corporate income tax in the national tax 
system (see table A2. in the appendix for details) and the size and level of base and rates, 
but also very specific corporate tax system features (tax facilities, loopholes, aimed at 
promoting certain activities (green investments, company child care et cetera). 
 
6. Negative externalities on the outsiders 
The ECUCT could induce negative externalities on EU members outside the ECUCT 
(Dewatripont c.s., 1995), in terms of undermining the internal market, thwarting 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and distorting competition. Although these 
possible negative effects are often mentioned (and, as was shown in section 5, constitute a 
formal barrier to establishing enhanced cooperation), there is no economic analysis 
available to make further interferences into their likelihood and magnitude. 
 
7. Positive externalities on the outsiders and on EU (integration) at large 
Another possibility is a positive externality: the ECUCT will pave the way for the 
countries left behind temporarily. These countries can benefit from the experimentation 
and learning on the pros and cons of cooperate tax harmonisation by the ECUCT members 
(Dewatripont cs., 1995). 
The possibility that enhanced cooperation in one field, by one group of countries, will 
extend to other areas and will thus benefit other countries has been put forward by inter 
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alia Baldwin (1993) who uses the term “domino effect”, by Pisany-Ferry (1995) who talks 
of a “centripetal force” and by Gomes de Andrade (2005) who uses the term “pull effect”. 
Besides this it may well be that those member states that do not wish to participate will do 
so because they feel their tax systems in specific areas should be more ‘tax-payer friendly’ 
than the ECUCT allows for; outsiders can choose to remain outside the ECUCT for 
reasons of tax competition.  
 
8. First-mover advantage 
Bordignon & Brusco (2003) and Bordignon (2005) have argued that the effects of 
enhanced cooperation should be assessed in a dynamic and stochastic context. Stochastic 
refers to the possibility that countries that may not want to join the ECUCT at t1 may 
decide to do so at t2. Dynamic refers to the influence of t1 on t2: what happens today is 
going to affect what happens tomorrow. Their argument is that even with no negative 
externalities taking place as such at t1 or at t2, enhanced cooperation may induce a welfare 
loss on outsiders because the first movers set the example which second movers must 
follow. In that way a relatively homogeneous but small group of countries can enforce 
their preferences on the larger group. The Treaty provisions, which were discussed in 
section 5, indeed enable first movers to create the acquis. 
Suppose that the ECUCT consists of countries only with relatively high tax rates 
(including Germany, France), and with the establishment of enhanced cooperation a 
common relatively high corporate tax rate is established based on (weighted) averages of 
the participating countries. Any other country wishing to join the ECUCT at a later stage 
will be confronted by the need to sharply increase its rate. What goes for the initial choice 
of rates goes for all other choices the ECUCT makes on system and base issues as well. 
Of course the Treaty to a certain extent deals with this problem by allowing outsiders to 
take part in the deliberations within the ECUCT and by allocating to the Commission (and 
to a lesser extent European Parliament) the task to guard the interests of all EU member 
states. 
 
9. Agglomeration effect of multi-speed integration 
One of the fears in this regard is that enhanced cooperation may lead to a permanent 
divide between insiders and outsiders, between a rich core and a poor periphery. Martin & 
Ottaviano (1995) argue that the outcome will probably depend on the level of labour 
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mobility. If capital is foot-loose and labour is sticky, the analysis of the effects of a 
reduction of transaction costs within the enhanced cooperation zone (they do not focus 
specifically on corporate taxation) can be limited to the issue of re-location of firms in 
relation to income convergence/divergence. If there is a tendency to re-locate from the 
outside to the inside of the enhanced cooperation zone, outsiders will suffer an initial 
economic blow, will have to catch up and have to think about the proper timing (in terms 
of income convergence) of joining the club. If labour is mobile as well, permanent 
divergence of incomes is likely, which Martin & Ottaviano have labelled the 
“agglomeration effect of multi-speed integration”. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the possible effects. 
 
Table 3: Possible effects of enhanced cooperation in corporate taxation 
Range of effect Effect Positive/negative 
Reduced deadweight loss in company tax 
compliance costs 
+ 
Increased trade + 
More efficient allocation of capital + 
GDP change <> tax revenue change, due to 
harmonization of base/rate 
+/--, but differences between 
particpants 
Within ECUCT 
Preference distortion -- 
Negative externalities -- for outsiders 
Positive externalities + for outsiders 
First-mover advantage + for insiders ; -- for outsiders  
Effect vis-à-vis 
outsiders 
Agglomeration effect + for insiders ; -- for outsiders 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has offered only a tentative treatment of possibilities for and possible effects of 
sub-integration concerning corporate taxation. As far as these possible effects are 
concerned we can quote Bordignon (2005:9): “This is basically all we have on ECAs”23. 
Much remains to be done. However, three general conclusions can be made. 
First, alternative (sub-)integration is currently the main way to deal with direct tax 
coordination problems by EU member states. Given the substantive and procedural 
requirements for enhanced cooperation, this approach remains valid, even with these 
requirements having been relaxed by the Nice Treaty (and consequently by the draft 
                                                          
23 ECAs are Enhanced Cooperation Associations. 
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Constitutional Treaty). Countries interested in pursuing the idea of a CCCTB could 
relatively easily either engage in an inter se formal agreement (multi-lateral tax treaty) or 
use the Code of Conduct instrument. 
Secondly, enhanced cooperation under the Nice Treaty (as well as under the draft 
Constitutional Treaty) creates a partial acquis resulting in a first-mover advantage. On the 
one hand, such an advantage could be an incentive for hesitant member states to 
participate in the ECUCT from day one, or to promote moves forward for the EU as a 
whole. On the other hand, it creates rigidity at later stages. It should be made possible to 
make the partial acquis negotiable upon accession to ECUCT by newcomers. 
Thirdly, the actual composition of the ECUCT is of great importance. There are 
considerable differences in tax rates and systems between the member states that currently 
support the idea of a CCTB (Austria, France, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, and 
Hungary), with the German economy posing its own problems in terms of being an outlier 
in this field. Just as with Optimal Currency Areas and the EMU, further research should 
done on optimal ECUCTs. 
 
 
-0-0-0-0-0- 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1:  Corporate income tax as % of GDP 
 
Taken from European Commission (2005:236) 
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Table A2: Corporate income ax as % of total taxation  
 
Taken from European Commission (2005:237) 
